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The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1970-1971 Term
A Symposium
[Editor's Note. The articles in this symposium discuss selected decisions of
Louisiana appellate courts reported in the advance sheets dated July 1, 1970
to July 1, 1971.J

PRIVATE LAW
PERSONS
Lee Hargrave*
The Obligation of Support--Criminal Neglect of Family
The obligation of a man to support his wife and children
has been imposed by Louisiana's positive law from the earliest
days and remains an important part of the present Civil Code.1
Ironically, however, the procedures for enforcing this basic
humanitarian obligation remain inadequate. The wife is prevented from suing her husband for support during the marriage
until a suit for separation from bed and board or divorce is
filed.2 The minor child is also denied the capacity to sue his
parents as long as he is not emancipated or his parents are not
judicially separated or divorced; even after separation or divorce,
he cannot sue the parent granted his custody and control. 8
Absent some other effective remedy, the combined result of
this legislation is to encourage separation and divorce actions
by wives seeking support payment for themselves and their children.4 If the state is interested in discouraging such separations
and divorces and in encouraging marital stability, it ought to
remove the above-mentioned procedural incapacities so that
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 120, 227, 228. Substantially similar earlier code
provisions are: La. Civ. Code arts. 122, 243, 244 (1825); La. Digest of 1808,
bk. I, tit. IV, art. 20; bk. I, tit. VII, art. 46, bk. I, tit. VII, art. 47.
2. LA. R.S. 9:291 (Supp. 1961), added by La. Acts 1960, No. 31, § 2, on
recommendation of the Louisiana State Law Institute to transfer into the
Revised Statutes provisions of La. Code of Practice art. 105 (1870).
3. IA. R.S. 9:571 (Supp. 1961), added by La. Acts 1960, No. 31, § 3, on recommendation of the Louisiana State Law Institute to transfer into the
Revised Statutes provisions of La. Code of Practice art. 104 (1870).
4. Though a wife may not wish to be judicially separated or divorced,
she must sue for one ur the other to avoid the procedural incapacities to
her suit for support. See The Work of the Louisia-na Appellate Courts for
the 1963-1964 Term-Persons, 25 LA. L. REV. 291, 298 (1965).
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those in need can effectively enforce the obligation of support
during the existence of the marriage. This the state has not yet
chosen to do.
Rather, the state chose to make neglect of family a criminal
offense and to enforce the support obligation through a succession of statutes patterned after the Uniform Desertion and Nonsupport Act, 5 now codified as articles 74 and 75 of the Criminal
Code.0 Accepting the incapacity of the wife and children to
sue for support, the district attorney was chosen as the party
to enforce the obligation. This does circumvent to some extent
the procedural incapacities of the main parties in interest, but
it is a remedy with which many district attorneys are not sympathetic, especially since overworked prosecutors have more important priorities to contend with in light of expanding criminal
activity. The legislation also deprives the overall scheme of
its most effective enforcers; it would seem reasonable to assume
that the deprived parties, the neglected wives and children,
would be the most anxious and energetic enforcers of their
rights, rather than some government agency or official.8
Even so, the criminal neglect statute demonstrates the desire of the state to lend its coercive power to enforcement of the
support obligation. 9 However, the courts' restrictive interpretation of those statutes has prevented them from being as effective
as they might be. 10 The recent case of Marchese v. Schulte"
5. 10 U.L.A. (1922).
6. LA. R.S. 14:74, 75 (1950). See La. Acts 1902, No. 34; La. Acts 1932, No.

77, § 1; La. Acts 1942, No. 43, arts. 74, 75; La. Acts 1950, No. 164, § 1; La. Acts
1952, No. 368, § 1; La. Acts 1968, No. 233, § 1; La. Acts 1968(E.S) No. 14, § 1.
Similar provisions were incorporated into the constitution by La. Acts, No.
543, adopted Nov. 3, 1964, as LA. CONST. art. VII, § 54. By La. Acts 1966, No.
311, § 2, similar provisions were incorporated into the Revised Statutes as

LA. R.S. 15:304 (1950).
7. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1951-1952 Term

-Criminal Law, 13 LA. L. REv. 230, 247 (1953).
8. Granted the fact that some wives and children do not have the ability

to hire an attorney to represent them In such proceedings, the possibility of
having the district attorney act for them fills a void. But the gradually increasing availability of free legal services makes more attractive the option
of enforcement by private litigation rather than unqualifiedly requiring
enforcement by a district attorney. When there are substantial back payments due, as in Marchese v. Schulte, 235 So.2d 605 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970),

the possibility of hired attorneys increases.
9. LA. R.S. 14:75 (1950), comment by the reporters; Bennett, The Louisiana Criminal Code-A Comparison of PriorLouisiana Criminal Law, 5 LA.
L. REv. 6, 39 (1942).

10. See Comment, 10 LA. L. REV. 481 (1950); Comment, 12 LA. L. REV.
301 (1952); Louisiana Legislation of 1952, 13 LA. L. REV. 21, 59 (1952); The
Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1951-1952 Term-Criminal
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continues this restrictive interpretation by denying enforcement
of the criminal support order in the civil courts. It holds that
a divorced wife and children (the procedural incapacity to sue
having been removed by the divorce) cannot collect by civil proceedings arrearagesin support payments the husband/father had
been ordered to pay by a juvenile court applying the provisions
of article 75 of the Criminal Code.
The neglect statutes, amended many times to make them
more effective,'12 now provide that a defendant (by the terms
of article 74) who deserts or intentionally does not support his
children or his wife who are in destitute or necessitous circumstances is guilty of a criminal offense. He can be fined not more
than five hundred dollars or sentenced to imprisonment for not
more than six months, or both; but by the terms of article 74,
"if a fine should be imposed, the court may direct it to be paid
in whole or in part to the wife . . . or the minor child or children . . . ." If a fine is imposed and paid to the state, one can
say this is a criminal proceeding; but it could also be said that
it is a criminal remedy imposed to implement a civil obligation
which cannot otherwise be enforced, as the comment by the
reporters for the Criminal Code indicates. 13 The coercive force
of the state is being used as a means of encouraging the defendant to support his family. However, if the "fine" is paid to the
family rather than to the state, one is leaving the "criminal"
law, for the criminal law's domain hardly encompasses forcing one
individual to pay money to another. This is more akin to the relationships created by the civil law, and the provisions of article
74 allowing the paying of the "fine" to the wife and children
seem as "civil" as they are "criminal." The whole legislative
scheme is to enforce a civil obligation of support, and the district attorney serves as a means of aiding the family which is
unable to aid itself because of the procedural incapacity to sue.
Law, 13 LA. L. REv. 230, 248 (1953); The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court
for the 1951-1952 Term-Persons, 13 LA. L. REv. 230, 261 (1953); Note, 14 LA.
L. REV. 898 (1954); The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 19541955 Term-Persons, 16 LA. L. REv. 211, 221 (1956); Note, 16 LA. L. REv. 799
(1956); The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1958-1959 TermPersons, 20 LA. L. REv. 201, 213 (1960); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1968-1964 Term-Persons, 25 LA. L. REV. 291, 298 (1965).
11. 235 So.2d 605 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
12. See authorities cited in notes 6 and 9 supra.

13. "The alimony provisions of this section are necessary in order to
protect a wife who does not want to divorce her husband and yet wants to
force him to support her." IA. R.S. 14:75 (1950), comment by reporters.
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But even conceding that the payment of the "fine" to the
wife under article 74 is somehow "criminal" rather than "civil"
(since it is a penalty for prior misconduct and the defendant is
penalized for failure to have supported in the past), article 75
is a different creature altogether. The article creates another
option for the court, an option that is not termed a fine. Rather
than, or in addition to, the fine provided, the court is granted an
option which looks to the future behavior of the father/husband.
The court is granted the discretion to "issue an order directing
the defendant to pay a certain sum ...

to the wife . . .which

sum may be increased or decreased by the court from time to
time... ." The obligation of paying sums of money can be imposed, as one would expect, after conviction under article 74,
but it also can be imposed "before the trial for criminal neglect
of family" if the defendant consents. Granted, the obligation
imposed under article 75 results from the contemplation of or
the conviction under a criminal statute. But the obligation is
not a fine. It is not in a specific lump sum. It does not punish
for past actions, but provides for future support. It is the enforcement of the civil support obligation, and, functionally, once
it is issued, it has no essential difference from a court order of
support accompanying a divorce or separation action. 14 And the
statute specifically says that the sum shall be paid "to the wife,
or to the tutor or custodian of the minor child, or to an organization or individual approved by the court as fiduciary for such
wife or child." The sum is payable, not to the state, or through
the state, but to the wife or other fiduciary. Furthermore, the
amount is changeable, depending on changes in circumstances,
as it is with the civil support order. As interpreted by the supreme court, the statute does not create the support obligation,
15
but merely a means of enforcing it.
In any event, whatever labels may be used to describe the
procedure, it is a hybrid means of enforcing a civilly created6
duty of support with its own background and policy objectives.1
14. The amount payable under an article 75 support order and the amount
payable under normal alimony may be different. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1954-1955 Term-Persons, 16 LA. L. REV. 211,
221 (1956).
15. State v. Mack, 224 La. 886, 71 So.2d 315 (1954) ("in order to obtain
a conviction there must be established the existence of a civil obligation to
support .... ); State v. Hubbard, 228 La. 155, 81 So.2d 844 (1955).
16. In State v. Monroe, 30 N.J. 160, 165-66, 152 A.2d 362, 365 (1959), the
court used such a realistic approach to the New Jersey version of the Uniform Desertion and Nonsupport Act: "The legislative scheme comprehends
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It is not truly criminal-for then there would not be the provisions for payment to individuals. It is not truly civil-for then
the fine and imprisonment would not be involved. Granted, it
does use the coercive power of the state to enforce the obligation
-but how different is this from using the state's coercive power
under civil judgment process to enforce alimony judgments by
seizure and sale of a debtor's property? The state's coercive
power is invoked in either case.
But the court in Marchese v. Schulte seems to have depended heavily on the characterization of an article 75 support
order as criminal rather than civil to support its decision depriving civil courts of power to grant judgment for arrearages
under an article 75 order in a proceeding brought by the neglected wife and children. The court's analysis seems to be:
(a) article 74 is a criminal provision,
(b) article 75 is assimilated to article 74 and also characterized as criminal,
(c) an order of support under article 75 is a criminal judgment,
(d) a suit by the wife and children to collect arrearages
under such an article 75 order is not a civil matter,
(e) article 2781 of the Code of Civil Procedure contemplates
enforcement in civil courts of only civil judgments, and
thus
(f) this suit for arrearages cannot be enforced in civil district courts.
It is granted that articles 74 and 75 are listed in the Criminal
Code and further that article 74's fine and penalties are criminal
penalties. However, as discussed above, it is a step away from
this "criminalness" when the payment of the "fine" under article 74 is made to the dependents. It is a further step when an
article 75 order for future support is made. The attenuation is
greater when one comes to enforcing an article 75 order by
injunction. Further lessening of the criminal characterization
two proceedings, one civil and the other criminal, by means of a single complaint. Section 2 [analogous to article 74] defines the crime involved in the
present case. Under section 3 [analogous to article 751 . . . the court may
execute a final order for future support . . . . Manifestly, therefore, the
primary purpose is to assure an adequate and enforceable support order for
the welfare of the dependents and to avert the need for public maintenance."
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arises when, as in the instant case, the proceeding is to collect
past-due support under the article 75 order. The obligation
existed and was particularized by an order of alimony by a
proper court judgment. No criminal penalties were requested
for failure to comply with the order. Functionally, the plaintiff
was not doing anything different from that she would have done
in enforcing an alimony order by a civil court.
As said above, the problem is not one that is best handled
by invoking labels or characterizations, especially since the intent of the drafters of the provisions was clearly to have the
statute function in favor of the wife: "If it were not for the
alimony provisions in this section a wife who did not want to
divorce or judicially separate from her husband would be unable
to secure anything from him other than the fine imposed for
criminal neglect of family."'1 7 The legislation can be traced to
the provisions of the Uniform Desertion and Nonsupport Act,
where again the purpose of the statute was to protect the wife
and children. This legislation should be interpreted to effectuate
that legislative intent. That could have been done in this case
by realistic analysis: the enforcement procedure is neither criminal nor civil, but is a hybrid akin to civil proceedings that could
be given execution under the Code of Civil Procedure as any
other judgment.
Even assuming that the article 75 support order were to be
labelled a "criminal" judgment, article 2781 of the Code of Civil
Procedure does not preclude enforcement of arrearages under
such an order by a civil court; it merely provides "[a] judgment
rendered in a Louisiana court may be made executory in any
other Louisiana court of competent jurisdiction, if its execution
has not been and may not be suspended by appeal." There is no
language saying that only judgments of "civil" courts are enforceable. All that is needed is a judgment "rendered in a Louisiana
court." In this case, there was such a judgment rendered by
such a court. The article does require that the second court
wherein a judgment is to be made executory be one "of competent jurisdiction." In the instant case, there was no question of
jurisdiction over the person. There would also be jurisdiction
over the subject matter, for the constitution gives civil district
courts unlimited jurisdiction over all civil matters.'8 And, as
17. LA. R.S. 14:75 (1950), comments.
18. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 81.

See aZso notes 6 and 9 supra.
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discussed above, this is really a hybrid civil action akin to the
normal support enforcement actions courts try daily and should
be so treated.
The fact that the judgment of a criminal court underlay the
obligation sought to be enforced does not make the suit for enforcement of the obligation criminal. It is a suit between two
individuals seeking the enforcement of arrearages under an obligation created by law and recognized by a proper court.
Also lacking support is the court's statement that the twenty
dollars per week ordered to be paid was not a judgment in favor
of the plaintiff. The court reasoned it was a judgment "in the
interest of the state of Louisiana. Any alimony ordered under
LSA-R.S. 14:75 is not granted to the wife as a matter of right,
but only in the discretion of the Court-as an alternative to the
husband's serving a prison term."'19 In answer to this, it is clear
that an article 75 support order is not a judgment in favor of the
State of Louisiana. By the terms of the article, the support is
not paid to the state, nor even through the state; it is paid to the
wife or other fiduciary for the children. 20 To say that the alimony
is not a matter of right to the wife is of no consequence. Louisiana Supreme Court decisions have said that alimony after divorce is not a matter of right, but is payable in the discretion of
the trial judge. 21 Even it were a matter of right in the latter case
and not in the former, that would still make no difference with
respect to enforcement of the orders of support once they are
granted.
In dictum the court indicates that not even a criminal or
juvenile court would have the power to grant, upon suit by dependents, judgments in favor of those dependents against a husband and father providing for collection of past-due payments
under article 75 support orders. The court contemplates that
only the district attorney could institute suit to collect such
arrearages. Certainly, article 75's provisions for enforcement
contemplate action by the district attorney through contempt
proceedings and possible imprisonment upon failure to pay. But
article 75 does not state that it is exclusive. It would in fact be
19. Marchese v. Schulte, 235 So.2d 605, 607 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
20. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
21. E.g., Jones v. Jones, 232 La. 102, 93 So.2d 917 (1957). See The Work
of the Louisiana Supreme Court for. the 1956-1957 Term-Persons, 18 LA. L.
Rov. 10, 24.
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exclusive so long as there is procedural incapacity for the wife
or children to sue, but once removed (as following a divorce),
there is no reason for denying individual action. Again, the
simple fact is that the individuals who are deprived or neglected
are the ones most anxious to collect and would be most efficient
in collecting arrearages. Also, normal means of enforcing judgments-levying property or garnishing wages-would seem to be
a more humane means of enforcement than using the statute's
contempt provisions for imposing a non-supporting father, who
is not likely to be able to earn money to support his family while
in "debtor's prison."
It would seem, therefore, that the technical problems evidenced in this case and discussed here would be best solved by
reducing the immunity from suit now granted the husband, and
by allowing the wife and/or minor children to sue during the
existence of the marriage. In the absence of this it would seem
that a reversal of this case would be in order, or a change in the
legislation making it clear that "civil" courts can entertain suits
seeking to make executory judgments of "criminal" courts ordering support payments under article 75.
PROPERTY
A. N. Yiannopoulos
Public Things; Navigable Waterbottoms
In Carter v. Moore,' the Louisiana Supreme Court had the
opportunity to reconsider the scope of application of Act 62 of
1912,2 as interpreted in CaliforniaCo. v. Price.8 The matter was
discussed extensively in the last issue of this Review. It suffices
to state here that the majority opinion deserves attention, because, in effect, it attributes to Act 62 of 1912 a narrower scope
of application than that suggested by the Price decision. Thus it
is now clear that when a defective patent is cancelled at the
request of a successor to the original patentee, neither the 1912
repose statute nor Price may be invoked to compel re-issuance
of the original patent. The Carter decision, however, is much
1. 258 La. 921, 248 So.2d 813 (1971).
2. See La. Acts 1912, No. 62, now R.S. 9:5661 (1950). For detailed discussion, see A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY, § 32 (1965); Yiannopoulos,
Validity of Patents Conveying Navigable Waterbottoms; Act 62 of 191$,
Price, Carter and All That, 32 IA. L. REv. 1 (1971).
3. 225 La. 706, 74 So.2d 1 (1954).

